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ABSTRACT
We analyze the e¤ect of accounting bias on the competition and market structure
of an industry. In our model, rmsinterim accounting reports on investment projects
may contain bias introduced by the mandatory accounting system. We nd that this
bias strictly decreases rmsprots when investors do not have an abandonment op-
tion, but di¤erent results emerge when we allow the investors to divest in the interim.
Specically, a conservative accounting regime may increase the likelihood of projects
being discontinued, inducing some rms to exit from the product market and leaving
rivals to capture their market share. A conservative regime can thus soften market
competition and result in ex ante higher investment payo¤, higher consumer surplus,
and higher total social welfare. Since industries often have common reporting stan-
dards, we also identify the degrees of industry-wide accounting bias that maximize the
expected investor payo¤s. Finally, we allow for investors to coordinate their divestment
decisions when both rms report unfavorable costs and show an improvement to both
rm prots and consumer surplus.
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Workshop at the University of Basel and the Kellogg Accounting Research conference for
helpful discussions and comments. The authors thank Tim Gray for editing assistance.
1 Introduction
Companies sometimes discontinue a product and exit from a market. In an im-
perfect product market, one rms exit means its market share is taken over by the
surviving rivals. For example, when Microsoft discontinued Zune, all its market share
in the portable media player market shifted to Apple. It is well established that exit
inducement, similar to entry deterrence, can soften competition in a market. In this
paper, we demonstrate how mandated accounting conservatism might encourage in-
vestors to divest, which would result in rms exiting a particular industry. Accounting
conservatism thus plays the role of a coordination mechanism and leads to less compe-
tition.1
This e¤ect arises primarily through the investorsdivestment decisions, which are
based on the accounting signals reported for the projects they invest in. The account-
ing conservatism contained in nancial reports could lead the investors to abandon
the projects, thus softening competition or even completely shutting down the prod-
uct market. However, excessive divestment need not leave the investors worse o¤.
A conservative bias in accounting can result in higher ex ante expected investment
payo¤ than under the benchmark of unbiased accounting. Thus rms competing in
an oligopoly and their investors may prefer an accounting regime with a deliberate
conservative bias.
We consider two rms that compete in a Cournot market. Each is owned by an
investor and run by a hired manager. The rms operate under the same accounting
regime that, for exogenous reasons, generates project reports with a conservative or
aggressive bias. Even though each rms managers privately learns the true cost in-
formation, he must issue a public report following the requirements of the accounting
regime. Investors then decide whether to leave or stay, based on the reported cost
information.
As a starting point, we examine the case where the investors have no interim aban-
donment option. We show that, relative to unbiased accounting, a rms prot is
strictly lower under both conservatively and aggressively biased accounting. We also
show that the protability decreases with the degree of conservatism or aggressiveness.
In addition, we nd the consumer surplus is strictly higher and the total social welfare
is strictly lower under both biased regimes.
In contrast, when investors can divest in the interim, mandated conservative ac-
counting leads to excessive divestment. After the divestment of one rm, its rival
becomes the monopolist of the market. The rival can then earn a higher prot due to
the change in the market structure. We show that rms are ex ante better o¤ with
conservative accounting, when the potential gain in prots due to the change in market
1Prior research examines other forms of exit inducement. Specically, a rm can adopt predatory
pricing (dumping) as well as nonprice strategies to force rivals to exit. For example, Kreps and Wilson
(1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982) model how a predatory rm could develop a reputation for
always preying on other rms to scare them o¤. Fudenberg and Tirole (1986) analyze a setting in
which the predator uses signal-jamming to mislead the prey into leaving the market.
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structure outweighs the potential loss due to excessive divestment. Furthermore, we
show that consumer surplus and total social welfare could be higher under a conser-
vative regime. Under an aggressive regime, however, rms may divest less frequently,
leading to intensied competition in the product market. The e¤ects of aggressive bias
on rm prot and consumer surplus in our model are ambiguous.
Next, we examine whether a degree of industry-wide mandatory accounting bias
exists that maximizes the rmsexpected prots. Every industry has its own reporting
norms. These norms can be explicitly lobbied for and formalized into accounting
rules, or they can be implicitly coordinated by industry participants in their reporting
practices. We nd interior solutions of a prot-maximizing degree of bias for both
conservative and aggressive regimes.
Last, we explore the case where both rms report bad costs. If one of the investors
chooses not to abandon her project while the other investor does, the rst rm be-
comes a monopolist. A monopolist with unfavorable costs may still generate a prot
that is higher than its assets liquidation value. We allow for a solution with corre-
lated equilibrium, through which the rms can coordinate on a public signal for their
divestment decisions. This coordination leaves not only the investors better o¤ but
also the consumer surplus higher, since the product market survives with at least one
monopolist.
Our results depend on two critical assumptions. First, investors must have an
interim abandonment option. Firm assets may depreciate over time but must maintain
a positive interim value. The investors choose to divest only if future investment payo¤s
are lower than the assetsinterim value. This value could partially proxy for the exit
barrier faced by rms competing in the industry. A higher value of the liquidated
assets indicates a lower exit barrier. Second, the interim report about the rms future
investment payo¤ can only be generated by a mandated accounting system, and the
managers have no other channel to communicate with the investors about future prot.
Our paper closely relates to prior studies on the impact of potential entry on the
incumbents disclosure behavior, when the incumbent has private information.2 To
scare o¤ entrants, a monopolist with private rm-specic information could adopt
a limit pricing strategy (charging a price below monopoly-price level) or aggressive
advertising to signal its superior costs (Milgrom and Roberts, 1982; Harrington, 1986;
Srinivasan, 1991; Bagwell, 2007; etc.). On the other hand, when the private information
concerns a market-wide factor, the incumbent will prefer to deter entry by reporting
bad news to indicate a lack of prospects. Darrough and Stoughton (1990) examine
how the threat of entry may a¤ect a rms incentive to disclose information about
the product market. They show that the incumbent prefers full disclosure only when
projections about the market are optimistic or the entry barrier is low. Guo (2012)
examines the e¤ect of conservatism in an oligopoly and nds that it could benet rms
2Without private information, strategies of entry deterrence and exit inducement are often the
same. A rm, for example, could commit to building excess production capacity, which could drive
out rivals and scare away potential entrants. However, when private information is present, strategies
may di¤er depending on the nature of the information.
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when there is no entry threat but that the opposite is true when faced with a potential
entrant.
The rms in our model possess rm-specic private information. However, they
prefer to report a downwardly biased signal to promote exit, including their own po-
tential exit, from the product market. This di¤ers from the entry deterrence strategies
used in prior studies. While rms prefer to report good rm-specic news in an entry
deterrence game, rms in our model prefer to report bad rm-specic news. They
also face a trade-o¤ quite di¤erent from the rms in prior studies. The incumbent in
Darrough and Stoughton (1990), for example, faces a trade-o¤ between disclosing good
information to improve its stock price and not disclosing to deter entry. Our rms
decision involves weighing the benet of becoming the surviving monopolist against
the cost of shutting down.
Our paper also relates to studies of the interaction of accounting disclosure and
product market competition without entry and exit. Darrough (1993) examines the
reporting of rms with private information when engaged in Cournot or Bertrand
competition. She nds that rms in a Cournot market with substitutable products
prefer full disclosure and that reporting bias reduces their expected prots. Our analy-
sis for the case where there is no interim abandonment option conrms her results.
Wagenhofer (1990) studies a rms optimal voluntary disclosure strategy when facing
a rival and nds that these disclosures may increase the rms product price while
simultaneously imposing a proprietary cost. Reis and Stocken (2007) contrast the in-
formativeness of historical costing and fair value measurement in a strategic setting.
Bagnoli and Watts (2010) examine how two rms bias their accounting reports when
competing in a Cournot product market and the e¤ect of accounting bias on the rms
production decision. Corona and Nan (2013) nd that rms competing with each other
strategically over-report their planned future activities in pre-announcements. Finally,
Friedman et al. (2016) examine the e¤ect of conservatism on rm and industry prots
and nd that industry prots increase/decrease when the reported information is rm-
specic/industry-wide. None of these studies involves a change in market structure
through entry or exit.
Another stream of literature our paper relates to looks at accounting conservatism
and debt.3 Prior studies examine the e¤ect of conservatism on debt covenants. Venu-
gopalan (2009) and Gigler et al. (2009) show that conservatism does not improve
debt-contracting e¢ ciency. Li (2013) demonstrates that conservatism may increase
the borrowers prots when renegotiation is allowed. Caskey and Hughes (2012), in
contrast, show that debt covenants based on conservative measures outperform those
based on fair value measures in deterring asset substitution. Several other studies focus
3Several studies explain conservatism from perspectives other than debt contracting. Bagnoli and
Watts (2005), for example, model conservatism in a signaling model. Kwon et al. (2001), Kwon (2005),
Chen et al. (2007), and Raith (2009) justify conservatism as a mechanism to mitigate contracting
problems in an agency setting. Kirschenheiter and Ramakrishnan (2012) regard conservatism as a
natural consequence of managersrisk aversion and prudence. Beyer (2013) explains the benets of
conservatism in lieu of accounting information aggregation.
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on the e¤ect of conservatism on collateral. Goex and Wagenhofer (2009) nd conser-
vatism is optimal in the reporting of collateral value, especially in the case of asset
impairment. Cheynel and Michaeli (2012) study optimal accounting measurement of
assets in an n-rm economy. Their rms can provide and receive nancing from each
other. Using a general equilibrium approach, they characterize how the optimal ac-
counting policy and cost of capital depend on the economic environment. With the
exception of Cheynel and Michaeli (2012), all of these studies focus on a single-rm
setting.
Our contribution is threefold. First, we show biased accounting can soften product
market competition and induce changes in market structure; accounting regulation and
practice can have real e¤ects. Second, we show that conservatism need not decrease the
expected prots of an industry or rms. Prior analytical studies demonstrate a negative
e¤ect on debt e¢ ciency absent market competition. Our results, in contrast, show
that investors may prefer conservatism in the presence of imperfect product market
competition. In fact, conservatism could even lead to a higher total social welfare
under certain conditions. Third, we examine a competition-softening mechanism that
has not been studied. Firm exit through interim abandonment under conservative
accounting di¤ers from the strategies used by rms in prior research to deter entry. In
fact, Watts (2003) argues that an abandonment option is necessary to create demand
for conservatism in an equity setting.4 Our results could help explain the market
structures of industries that have low entry threat, perhaps due to high entry barriers,
but varied exit strategies.
Our results have empirical implications, especially related to inter-industry varia-
tion of accounting conservatism. We predict that industries with more conservative
accounting will, ceteris paribus, have a higher return on investment and lower cost of
equity. An event study could empirically test our predictions. For example, when all
rms in an industry face a mandated increase in conservatism, we predict that the
total production quantity and cost of capital will decrease, while product price and
return on investment will increase. A key control variable for these tests is the proxy
for exit barrier the market value for liquidated assets. When an industry requires
highly customized technology and equipment, its assets are likely to have low market
value once liquidated. Thus we predict liquidation value to be positively associated
with all major dependent variables.
4Empirical evidence also supports the use of accounting information in shareholdersabandonment
decisions. Berger, Ofek, and Swary (1996) show that shareholders use balance sheet information to
determine their abandonment option value, which is then integrated into the stock price. Hayn (1995)
nds that the income statement information also reects shareholdersconsideration for abandonment
option. Specically, she shows that di¤erent qualities of prots and losses are primarily due to this
abandonment option. Since the shareholders can choose to divest, should the rm values drop below
certain thresholds, losses do not perpetuate and therefore have a lower earnings response coe¢ cient.
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2 The Model
We consider a setting with two rms, i and j; each owned by an investor and run
by a hired manager. Each rm has invested cash I in a project to produce and sell
a new product to the consumer. Without losing generality, we assume the products
produced by the two rms are identical and perfectly substitutable. In each rm, the
investor approves the investment project, but the manager is responsible for the rms
operations including reporting and production.
Firm is manager privately observes the true realized costs of his rms product.
However, he cannot communicate the cost information to his investor except through
public accounting reports, which may be subject to bias imposed by the accounting
regime. Upon receiving the reports, rm is investor decides whether to continue to
invest or divest. If the investor decides to continue, the manager chooses a production
quantity to maximize the expected rm prot. To keep the model parsimonious, the
managers in our model do not create cost, nor do they add value to the rmspro-
duction. They merely observe the true costs and report them to the investors through
accounting signals. We then examine the interaction between these two rms and their
investors.
Following Vives (1984), the representative consumers utility from the two products
is U(Qi; Qj) = a(Qi +Qj)  12
 
Q2i + 2QiQj +Q
2
j

. The consumers problem is thus
(1) max
Qi;Qj
a(Qi +Qj)  1
2
 
Q2i + 2QiQj +Q
2
j
  PiQi   PjQj;
where P is the unit price for the product; a is the intercept of market demand; and Qi
and Qj are the quantities produced and sold by rm i and j, respectively. Solving the
representative consumers problem by taking the rst-order conditions with regard to
Qi and Qj, we derive the inverse demand function for the product:
(2) P = a Qi  Qj:
Firm is marginal cost Ci is its private information. We assume Ci 2 fcg; cbg, with
cb > cg > 0, where cb denotes unfavorable cost and cg denotes favorable cost. We
denote the probability of a rm having a low marginal cost as  = Pr fCi = cgg and
the probability of the rm having a high marginal cost as 1    = Pr fCi = cbg. The
marginal costs of the two rms are independent. Firm is prot from the investment
project is i = Qi(P   Ci).
We model the rmsaccounting environment through two variables,  2 [0; 1] and
 2 [0; 1], that represent the rmsreporting requirements. First, nature determines
whether rm is true cost is cg or cb. A report is then produced by an exogenously
determined accounting regime. There are three di¤erent accounting regimes: unbiased,
conservative, and aggressive. An unbiased regime generates a truthful cost report with
probability one. A conservative regime is dened as generating an upwardly biased cost
report. Specically, it generates an unfavorable cost report with probability one when
5
the true cost is unfavorable but generates a favorable cost report with probability  (and
an unfavorable cost report with probability 1 ) when the true cost is favorable.5 An
aggressive regime is the opposite of the conservative regime, generating a favorable cost
report with probability one when the true cost is favorable, and a favorable cost report
with probability  (and an unfavorable cost report with probability 1   ) when the
true cost is unfavorable. The degree of conservatism is thus 1   under a conservative
regime, and the degree of aggressiveness is  under an aggressive regime. For ease of
presentation, we denote the posterior probabilities of true cost being consistent with
the report as Pr [cgjc^g] =  and Pr [cbjc^b] = : Specically, under an unbiased regime,
 and  are both 1; under a conservative regime,  is 1 and  is 1 
(1 )+(1 ) ; under an
aggressive regime,  = 
+((1 )) and  is 1.
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Upon privately observing his own rms project cost, rm is manager discloses the
cost report bCi 2 fbcg;bcbg generated by the rms accounting system. The cost report
is observed by everyone in the economy, including the rm js competitor and the two
investors. The report may contain an accounting bias. When both rmsmanagers
simultaneously decide their rmsoutput quantities, rm is manager maximizes his
rms expected prot, conditional on (i) the realized value of its own true cost Ci, (ii)
its own cost report bCi, and (iii) its competitors cost report bCj. That is, the expected
prot for rm i from the investment project is
(3) i = i

Ci; bCi; bCj = E h(Qi(a Qi  Qj   Ci)jCi; bCi; bCji :
Obviously, rm is prot from Cournot competition varies under the di¤erent ac-
counting regimes. With perfect/unbiased accounting information, we know Ci = bCi is
always true. We thus denote a rms prot as a function of its own cost and the com-
petitors cost. For example, d (cg;cb) refers to a rms expected prot from duopolistic
competition when its own cost is good and its competitors cost is bad. With conser-
vative or aggressive accounting information, a rms expected prot is a function of
its own cost, its reported cost, and its competitors reported cost. For example, we
denote d (cg;bcb;bcb) as the rms duopolistic prot when its true cost is good, its report
is bad, and its competitors report is bad. For monopolistic prot, we use the notation
5Our denition of conservative accounting bias presumes that unfavorable reports are less infor-
mative, which is consistent with Venugopalan (2004), Chen et al. (2007), Gigler et al. (2009), Lu
et al. (2011), Gao (2013), and Li (2013). Other studies, however, model conservative accounting as
favorable reports being more informative in di¤erent contexts (Guay and Verrecchia, 2006; Goex and
Wagenhofer, 2009). In addition, Beyer (2012) models conservatism as a measurement rule such as
lower of cost or market. See Beyer (2012) for a more comprehensive summary.
6We construct the accounting regimes in this paper similar to the model of Venugopalan (2004),
who uses two variables, informativeness and conservatism, to dene an accounting system. However,
our analyses only focus on three special cases: 1) the unbiased regime, which coincides with the
case of maximum informativeness in Venugopalan (2004); 2) the conservative regime, corresponding
to partial informativeness and maximum conservatism; 3) the aggressive regime, corresponding to
partial informativeness and minimum conservatism. We do not consider the intermediate case of
partial conservatism, as the results of analyses become intractable in oligopoly setting.
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of m (cg) or m (cb) ; as the reported cost plays no role here.
Figure 1 below summarizes the timeline of events.
0 1 2 3 4
Firms invest Product costs Investors Products Payo¤s
to produce a revealed and decide to made and realized
new product. cost reports continue or sold (if project for all.
generated. divest. is continued).
Figure 1: Timeline of events in equity nancing.
In time 0, the rmsinvestors decide to invest in a project to produce and sell a new
product. In time 1, the product costs are realized and the cost reports are generated
by the respective rmsaccounting regimes. Based on the reports, the investors decide
to continue or divest. In time 3, the rms compete in the product market and the
managers make production quantity decisions. Finally, in time 4, the investors receive
their payo¤s. We assume that the structure of the model and its parameters are com-
mon knowledge and employ the standard subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept
(except in section 4.5 where we discuss correlated equilibrium).
3 Without Abandonment Option
As a benchmark, we rst examine the rmsprots when the investors commit to
always continue the investment projects, regardless of the accounting reports. That is,
the investors never abandon the projects, and the two rms always get to compete in
a Cournot market. Firm is expected prot is simply the sum of its prots under the
three di¤erent accounting regimes weighted by the corresponding probabilities.7 Under
an unbiased accounting regime, the ex ante expected prot for rm i is
E [unb:] = 
2d (cg;cg) + (1  )2d (cb;cb)
+(1  )d (cg;cb) + (1  )d (cb;cg) :(4)
Under a conservative regime, the ex ante expected rm prot is
E [con:] = 
22d (cg;bcg;bcg) +  (1  ) d (cg;bcg;bcb)
+2(1  )d (cg;bcb;bcg) +  (1  ) (1  ) d (cg;bcb;bcb)
+ (1  ) d (cb;bcb;bcg) + (1  ) (1  ) d (cb;bcb;bcb) :(5)
7Please refer to Appendix A for the calculations.
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Under an aggressive regime, the ex ante expected rm prot is
E [agg:] =  ( +    ) d (cg;bcg;bcg) +  (1  ) (1  ) d (cg;bcg;bcb)
+ (1  ) ( +    ) d (cb;bcg;bcg) + (1  )2  (1  ) d (cb;bcg;bcb)
+ (1  ) (1  ) ( +    ) d (cb;bcb;bcg) + (1  )2 (1  )2 d (cb;bcb;bcb) :(6)
Proposition 1. When rms compete in a Cournot fashion with investors who always
choose to let the projects continue, their prots under the conservative or the aggressive
accounting regime are strictly lower than that under the unbiased regime, and the prots
decrease with the level of conservatism/aggressiveness.
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 demonstrates that accounting bias decreases expected rm prot in
a Cournot setting. The rms thus prefer a less biased accounting regime. The rea-
son for the decreased prot is the e¢ ciency loss caused by the accounting distortion.
For example, there are two scenarios when the rm prot is higher under a conserva-
tive accounting system than under an unbiased system: d (cg;bcg;bcb) and d (cg;bcb;bcb).
However, the prots from the other four scenarios are all lower under a conservative
accounting system than under an unbiased one. The losses thus outweigh the gains.
Note that this result resembles the nding of Darrough (1993), who shows that report-
ing noise about cost information reduces expected rm prots in Cournot competition.
However, our result also di¤ers from that of Darrough (1993) in that the noise in her
model is independent of the state, while the bias/noise in our model is state-dependent.
The following gure demonstrates the e¢ ciency loss due to accounting distortion.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
gamma
Pi
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
7.4
7.5
7.6
7.7
delta
Pi
A: Conservative bias B: Aggressive bias
 unbiased regime; - - - conservative regime;    aggressive regime
Numerical values:  = 0:5, a = 10, cg = 1, cb = 3.
Figure 2: Prot prot as a function of accounting bias.
We also analyze the e¤ect of accounting bias on consumer surplus and social welfare.
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We denote consumer surplus as V , which is:
V =
Z (Qi+Qj)
0
(P (Q)  P ) dQ
=
1
2
 
Qi +Q

j
2
;(7)
where P (Q) = a  (Qi +Qj) ; Qi and Qj are the equilibrium production quantities for
rm i and j in Cournot competition and P  is the equilibrium price for the product.
We denote the total social welfare as W; the sum of rm prot and consumer surplus:
(8) W = V + i + j   2I:
Corollary 2. When rms compete in a Cournot fashion with investors who always
choose to let the rms continue with operations, the consumer surplus under the con-
servative or the aggressive accounting system is strictly higher than that under the
unbiased accounting system, but the total social welfare under the conservative or the
aggressive accounting system is strictly lower than that under the unbiased accounting
system.
Proof. See appendix.
Corollary 2 shows that the consumer surplus is higher when accounting reports are
biased. This is because the expected production quantity under the conservative or
the aggressive accounting regime is higher than under the unbiased accounting regime.
Higher production quantity then leads to a higher level of consumer surplus. Fig-
ure 3 demonstrates the increase of consumer surplus as a function of the accounting
conservatism or aggressiveness.
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
14.34
14.36
14.38
14.40
14.42
14.44
14.46
gamma
V
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
14.34
14.36
14.38
14.40
14.42
14.44
14.46
delta
V
A: Conservative bias B: Aggressive bias
 unbiased regime; - - - conservative regime;    aggressive regime
Numerical values:  = 0:5, a = 10, cg = 1, cb = 3.
Figure 3: Consumer surplus as a function of accounting bias.
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However, since the loss in the rmsprots is greater than the increase in the consumer
surplus, the total social welfare is still lower under the conservative or the aggressive
accounting system than under the unbiased one. Corollary 2 thus demonstrates that
accounting bias hurts the total social welfare when interim abandonment is not allowed.
4 With Abandonment Option
We now allow the investors the interim option to abandon the projects. We assume
the assets employed by the projects depreciate. At time zero, the investor invests cash
I to acquire assets. At time two, these assets depreciate to an amount K < I, which is
the abandonment value should the investors decide to terminate the project. By time
4, the assets would have depreciated to zero market value. The value of K matters in
the investorstermination decision, as it represents the exit barrier of rms competing
in the same industry.8 We assume K is neither too high nor too low, to ensure that
the investors only divest when receiving a bad cost report.
The investors rely on the rmscost reports to make their divestment decisions.
For rm is investor, there are four scenarios of cost reports: 1) both rms report good
costs; 2) rm i reports good cost, and rm j reports bad cost; 3) rm i reports bad
cost, and rm j reports good cost; 4) both rms report bad costs. We denote the rms
expected payo¤ as a function of the investors information set,  (bci;bcj). For each of
the four scenarios, investor i must compare the expected future project payo¤with the
abandonment value K to determine whether to divest or continue.
4.1 Unbiased accounting regime
Under an unbiased accounting regime, both favorable and unfavorable cost real-
izations are reported truthfully. That is,  (bci;bcj) is exactly the same as d (ci;cj) :
Examining the rmsCournot prots under an unbiased accounting regime, we know
d (cg;cb) > d (cg;cg) > d (cb;cb) > d (cb;cg) : We assume d (cg;cg) > K > d (cb;cb).
Thus a rm whose project has a favorable cost is always going to have higher prot
than a rm whose project has an unfavorable cost. Furthermore, the prot of a rm
whose project has a favorable/unfavorable cost is always higher/lower than K. The
investor i thus always chooses to divest when receiving an unfavorable report.9
An interesting result emerges when one rm issues a favorable report and the other
issues an unfavorable one. The rm with an unfavorable report terminates its project,
8Although we assume the value of K as exogenous, it is often determined by a separate market for
liquidated assets. Cheynel and Michaeli (2012) adopt a general equilibrium approach for the valuation
of such assets. Shleifer and Vishny (2010), on the other hand, examine a market for assets in which
demand and supply are determined by the number of rms going bankrupt in an industry. The more
rms are bankrupt, the less valuable the liquidated assets and hence the resulting re sale.
9Of course, for su¢ ciently high abandonment value K, such as K > m (cg), both investors would
abandon their projects. If K < d (bcb;bcg) ; the investors would never divest, and the rmsprots
remain the same as when there is no interim abandonment option.
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and the remaining rm becomes a monopolist in that product market and earns a higher
prot than when both rms have a favorable cost. That is, m (cg) > d (cg;cg) > K.
Table 1 presents the rmsprots from their investment projects:
Firm 1
Firm 2
C = cg
Prob. = 
C = cb
Prob. = 1  
C = cg
Prob. = 
d (cg; cg)
d (cg; cg)
m (cg)
K
C = cb
Prob. = 1  
K
m (cg)
K
K
Table 1. Firm prots under an unbiased accounting regime
Firm is total expected prot under an unbiased accounting regime is
(9) E [unb:] = 
2d (cg;cg) +  (1  ) m (cg) + (1  )K:
4.2 Conservative accounting regime
Under a conservative accounting regime, the rms must report an unfavorable cost
when the true cost is unfavorable. But when the true cost is favorable, the rm
may report a favorable cost with probability  and report an unfavorable cost with
probability 1   . The investors only observe the cost reports from both rms but
do not know the rmstrue costs. Examining rm is prots, we know d (bcg;bcb) 
d (bcg;bcg)  d (bcb;bcb)  d (bcb;bcg) always holds true. Similar to the unbiased regime,
we assume d (bcg;bcg)  K  d (bcb;bcb)10, which implies that the investors divest when
they receive a bad project cost report from their respective rms.
10Note that d (bcg;bcg) under the conservative accounting regime is equivalent to d (cg;cg) under
the unbiased accounting regime, as Pr fcgjc^gg = 1 when there is a conservative bias. d (bcb;bcb) is
generally higher in value than d (cb;cb) under the unbiased regime. When the level of conservatism
approaches zero, the value of d (bcb;bcb) approaches d (cb;cb) :
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The rmsprots from the investment projects are summarized in Table 2.
Firm 1
Firm 2
C = cg ; bC = bcg
Prob. = 
C = cg ; bC = bcb
Prob. = (1  )
C = cb ; bC = bcb
Prob. = (1  )
C = cg ; bC = bcg
Prob. = 
d (cg;cg)
d (cg;cg)
m (cg)
K
m (cg)
K
C = cg ; bC = bcb
Prob. = (1  )
K
m (cg)
K
K
K
K
C = cb ; bC = bcb
Prob. = (1  )
K
m (cg)
K
K
K
K
Table 2. Firm prots under a conservative accounting regime,
with d (cg;cg) > K > d (bcb; )  d (cb;cb) .
When the value of K is higher than d (bcb;bcb), investor i always chooses to divest
when receiving an unfavorable report. The total expected prot for rm i is
(10) E [con:] = 
22d (cg;cg) +  (1  ) m (cg) + (1  )K:
A conservative accounting bias induces two e¤ects in rm is expected project pay-
o¤. The rst e¤ect comes from misclassifying rm is cost as bad when it is actually
good, which increases the chance of rm is project being terminated and decreases
its expected prot. The second e¤ect comes from misclassifying rm js cost as bad
when it is actually good, which increases rm is prot. The di¤erence between rm
is expected prots under the conservative and unbiased regimes can be written as
E [con:]  E [unb:] =  (1  ) 2 (m (cg)  d (cg; cg))| {z }
misclassify competitor with good cost as bad
  (1  )  ((1  ) m (cg) + d (cg; cg) K)| {z }
misclassify own rm with good cost as bad
:(11)
Clearly, a rms expected prot is higher under the conservative accounting regime
than under the unbiased regime, if the e¤ect of misclassifying its competitors cost as
bad outweighs the e¤ect of misclassifying the rms own cost as bad when, in fact, it
is good.
Proposition 3. When rms compete in Cournot fashion and have investors who have
an interim abandonment option, E [con:] > E [unb:] if  > 12
m(cg) K
m(cg) d(cg ;cg) and 1  
 < 2   1

m(cg) K
m(cg) d(cg ;cg) ; and E [con:] increases in the degree of conservatism if  >
1
2
m(cg) K
m(cg) d(cg ;cg) and 1   < 1  12
m(cg) K
m(cg) d(cg;cg) .
Proof. See appendix.
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Without the abandonment option, the investorspayo¤s are strictly lower under the
conservative accounting regime than under the unbiased accounting regime. However,
Proposition 3 shows that the opposite e¤ect could emerge when interim abandonment
is allowed, provided the state of nature, ; is su¢ ciently good, and the degree of
conservatism, 1 ; is su¢ ciently low. This is because the competition-softening e¤ect
of conservatism must outweigh its cost in divestment when the costs are favorable.
Specically, the di¤erence between the rms duopoly prot d (cg; cg) and monopoly
prot m (cg) must be su¢ ciently large compared to the di¤erence between K and
d (cg; cg) for conservatism to benet the rm.
The rm prots also increase in the degree of conservatism imposed by the manda-
tory accounting system. This result is quite di¤erent from the prior literature, which
typically shows conservatism decreases investment e¢ ciency (e.g. Gigler et al., 2009;
Li, 2011). The reason for the di¤erent result in our setting is due to the fact that
accounting conservatism can indirectly change the industry structure and soften com-
petition.
Similarly, the expected consumer surplus, V; and expected total social welfare, W ,
are also a¤ected by the accounting regimes.
Corollary 4. When rms compete in Cournot fashion and have investors who have an
interim abandonment option, E [Vcon:] > E [Vunb:] if 1  < 78 ; and E [Wcon:] > E [Wunb:]
if 1   < 72K (18 13)(a cg)2
2(a cg)2 and  >
18(a cg)2 72K
13(a cg)2 .
Proof. See appendix.
Without the interim abandonment option, the consumer surplus strictly increases
but rm prots strictly decrease with the conservative accounting bias. However,
with the interim abandonment option, both consumer surplus and rm prots can
be higher under the conservative accounting system. The consumer surplus under the
conservative regime is higher than under the unbiased regime as long as the degree of
accounting conservatism 1  is not too high. This is largely consistent with the results
of Corollary 2, except when the degree of conservatism is too high, which results in a
high chance of the projects being terminated. The condition for a higher total social
welfare under the conservative system is primarily driven by the investors payo¤s,
rather than consumer surplus. Compared to the conditions in Proposition 1, the total
social welfare with interim abandonment may be higher under conservative regime
because the investorspayo¤s are higher.
4.3 Aggressive accounting regime
Under aggressive accounting regime, a rm may provide a good cost report even
when the true cost is bad with probability . Therefore a rm with truly bad cost
may still be allowed to continue and compete in the product market. Again we know
d (bcg;bcb)  d (bcg;bcg)  d (bcb;bcb)  d (bcb;bcg) always holds true, and we assume
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d (bcg;bcg)  K  d (bcb;bcb) :11 The investors thus divest when they receive a bad
report from their respective rms and stay when they receive a good report. The rm
prots are summarized in Table 3.
Firm 1
Firm 2
C = cg ; bC = bcg
Prob. = 
C = cb ; bC = bcg
Prob. = (1  ) 
C = cb ; bC = bcb
Prob. = (1  ) (1  )
C = cg ; bC = bcg
Prob. = 
d (cg;bcg;bcg)
d (cg;bcg;bcg) d(cg;bcg;bcg)d(cb;bcg;bcg) m (cg)K
C = cb ; bC = bcg
Prob. = (1  ) 
d(cb;bcg;bcg)
d(cg;bcg;bcg) d(cb;bcg;bcg)d(cb;bcg;bcg) m (cb)K
C = cb ; bC = bcb
Prob. = (1  ) (1  )
K
m (cg)
K
m (cb)
K
K
Table 3. Firm prots under an aggressive accounting regime
with d (cg;cg) > d (bcg; ) > K > d (cb;cb)
The total expected prot for rm is investor is
E [agg:] =
 
2 +  (1  ) d (cg;bcg;bcg) +  (1  )2 2 +  (1  ) d(cb;bcg;bcg)
+ (1  ) (1  ) m (cg) + (1  )2  (1  ) m (cb) + (1  ) (1  )K;(12)
and the di¤erence between expected prots under aggressive and unbiased regimes can
be written as
E [agg:]  E [unb:] =  (1  )  (K   ((1  )  + ) d(cb;bcg;bcg)  (1  ) (1  ) m (cb))| {z }
misclassify own rm with bad cost as good
  (1  )  (m (cg)  d (cg;bcg;bcg))| {z }
misclassify competitor with bad cost as good
+( ( +    )) (d (cg;bcg;bcg)  d (cg;cg))| {z }
correctly classify both rms as good
:(13)
Three e¤ects arise from the aggressive accounting bias in cost reports. When rm i
itself has bad cost but is misclassied as good, it earns a monopolist prot when the
competitor js project is terminated but loses the assetspotential liquidation value
K when j also survives. When competitor j with bad cost is misclassied as good,
rm i that has true good cost loses its monopoly prot. A third di¤erential e¤ect also
arises when both rms with good costs are correctly classied as good. Under the
conservative accounting regime, d (cg;bcg;bcg) = d (cg;cg) ; since both rms know the
11Under the aggressive accounting regime, d (bcb;bcb) = d (cb;cb) : d (bcg;bcg) is generally lower than
d (cg;cg) under the unbiased regime, except when the level of aggressiveness is zero. In that case,
d (bcg;bcg) = d (cg;cg) : Thus the upper and lower bounds required for K under the aggressive system
are both lower than under the conservative system.
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other rm must have true good cost when good cost is reported. However, under the
aggressive accounting, d (cg;bcg;bcg) > d (cg;cg) ; because the rival rm j that reports
a good cost could have a bad cost.
The rst e¤ect, when rm i is misclassied as having good cost, is ambiguous on
rm is investment payo¤. The second e¤ect, when rm j is misclassied as having
good cost, results in a strict reduction in rm is prot. The third e¤ect, when both
rms are correctly classied as having good costs, results in an increase in rm is
prot. In general, the overall e¤ect of aggressive accounting on the rm prot and
consumer surplus is inconclusive.
4.4 Optimal level of industry-wide accounting bias
Accounting demonstrates distinct industry characteristics. Many industries, such
as the oil and gas industry and the nancial services industry, have specic accounting
rules and reporting requirements. Empirical research shows that public accounting
rms also respond to such demand by developing industry specializations (Craswell,
Francis, and Taylor 1995, Ferguson and Stokes 2002). Within a given industry, rms
can therefore coordinate and lobby for a nancial reporting standard that maximizes
their prots. It is thus not surprising that the rms settle on a commonly agreed level
of accounting bias.
When the investors do not have an interim abandonment option, accounting bias
leads to strictly lower level of rm prot. That is, the level of industry-wide accounting
bias that maximizes the rmsprot is zero. When there is an abandonment option
available, however, the optimal levels of accounting bias have interior solutions.
Proposition 5. When rms compete in Cournot fashion and have investors who have
an interim abandonment option, the prot-maximizing level of industry-wide mandatory
accounting bias is 1    = 36K (9 10)(a cg)2
10(a cg)2 under the conservative regime, and  =
(5((cb cg)2 (a cg)2 (a cb)2)+9((a cb)2 4K))
10(1 )(a cb)2 under the aggressive regime.
Proof. See appendix.
We can also easily see that the prot-maximizing degree of conservatism increases
in both the abandonment value K and the state of nature : On the contrary, the
prot-maximizing degree of aggressiveness decreases in both K and :
4.5 Divestment and Coordination
When both rms report unfavorable costs, we have shown that the investors choose
to divest since d (bcb;bcb) < K. However, if we allow the investors to coordinate their
abandonment decisions, an improvement could result in the expected rm prots.
Specically, when one of the investors chooses not to terminate her project, while
the other investor does, the rst rm becomes a monopolist in the specic product
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market. A monopolist with unfavorable cost may still generate a level of prot that is
higher than the assetsliquidation value. That is, the investor may be better o¤ not
to divest all the time if m (cb) > K.
Using the concept of correlated equilibrium, we let the two investors follow a ran-
dom public signal to coordinate their actions on divestment. This signal could be the
weather, the stock market performance, or anything that both investors could observe
publicly. The public signal has two outcomes, fA;Bg, each with a 1
2
probability of
occurrence. The two investors agree that investor i divests when A occurs and does
not when B occurs, and investor j divests when B occurs and does not divest when
A occurs. We can easily verify that such strategies are the best responses for both
investors and the investors have no incentive to deviate.
Proposition 6. When both rms give unfavorable cost reports, given a random public
signal with two outcomes fA;Bg and Pr [A] = Pr [B] = 1
2
; investor i can follow a
strategy to always divest when observing A and not divest when observing B. The
resulted prot for rm i is 4K+(a cb)
2
8
under the unbiased and the aggressive accounting
regimes and 4K+(1 )(a cg)
2+(a cb)2
8
under the conservative accounting regime.
Proof. See appendix.
The correlated equilibrium generates a positive improvement in the rmsprots,
because it helps the rms avoid the undesirable outcome of (d (cb; cb) ;d (cb; cb)) while
capturing the benet of (m (cb) ; K) : In addition, the consumer surplus increases from
0 to (a cb)
2
8
under the unbiased and the aggressive accounting regimes, and from 0 to
(1 )(a cg)2+(a cb)2
8
under the conservative accounting regime. This is because, without
correlated equilibrium, both rms would be shut down, and there would be no products
sold on the market. When the two rms are allowed to coordinate through the public
signal, at least one rm will be producing at a time. The correlated equilibrium thus
leads to a Pareto improvement for all players when both rms report bad costs.
5 Conclusions
We show that accounting bias reduces expected protability when rms compete in
a Cournot product market and investors do not have an interim abandonment option.
In contrast, when investors are allowed to divest in the interim, rm prots can be
higher under the conservative accounting regime than under the unbiased regime. This
is because the investors rely on interim accounting reports to make their abandonment
decisions, and conservative bias in the reports increases the likelihood of divestment
and softens competition. In addition, we show that consumer surplus and total social
welfare can both be higher under the conservative regime.
We also identify optimal degrees of accounting bias that maximize the expected
investment payo¤ under both conservative and aggressive regimes. Since the rms in
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a given industry can lobby for the norms of nancial reporting, they may agree on a
degree of accounting bias that is ex ante preferred. Finally, we discuss the possibility of
coordinated divestment decisions when both rms report unfavorable costs and show
a Pareto improvement through a correlated equilibrium concept.
This insight of our results can be extended to debt nancing. When a debt covenant
is based on accounting reports, conservative accounting triggers debt covenant violation
more frequently. However, similar to the equity setting, the creditors liquidation
decisions can soften product market competition. The surviving rms get to capture
the entire market share and are more likely to generate enough prot to pay back the
debt. Therefore rms under conservative accounting regime that borrow can enjoy an
ex ante lower cost of debt.
In summary, our study shows how accounting can have a real e¤ect on rmsop-
erating decisions through the investorsabandonment option. Accounting bias is often
perceived to be merely a distortion of information and devoid of any real impact on eco-
nomic behavior. In our setting, however, accounting bias can change the competitive
nature of product markets in which the invested rms compete.
Our model is subject to several limitations. For example, we analyze a Cournot
market with two rms. As the number of participating rms in an industry rises, rm
prot decreases, and so does the rmsex ante incentive to exit and the competition-
softening e¤ect of accounting conservatism. Also, we only model identical rms. If the
participating rms are heterogeneous, it may become more di¢ cult for them to agree
on a common conservative accounting system that coordinates exit. However, none of
these scenarios should change our result qualitatively.
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Appendix
A Firmsproduction quantities and rm prots
Under the unbiased accounting regime, the reported costs are the same as the
realized costs. There are thus four di¤erent scenarios of information structure, resulting
in four di¤erent levels of production quantity and rm prot. Under the conservative
and the aggressive accounting regimes, the reported costs and the realized costs may
not be the same. Under the conservative accounting regime, a rm may have favorable
realized cost but unfavorable reported cost. Under the aggressive accounting regime,
a rm may have unfavorable realized cost but favorable reported cost. There are thus
six di¤erent scenarios under each regime, resulting in six di¤erent levels of production
quantity and rm prot.
The rmsproduction quantities and prots under the three di¤erent accounting
regimes are summarized below.
A.1 Unbiased accounting regime
Firm is cost Firm js cost
Firm is
prodution quantity
Firm is
prot
Ci= cg Cj= cg
Qd (cg;cg)
= (a cg)
3
d (cg;cg)
= (a cg)
2
9
Ci= cb Cj= cb
Qd (cb;cb)
= (a cb)
3
d (cb;cb)
= (a cb)
2
9
Ci= cg Cj= cb
Qd (cg;cb)
= (a cg)+(cb cg)
3
d (cg;cb)
= ((a cg)+(cb cg))
2
9
Ci= cb Cj= cg
Qd (cb;cg)
= (a cb) (cb cg)
3
d (cb;cg)
= ((a cb) (cb cg))
2
9
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A.2 Conservative accounting regime
Firm is
realized
cost
Firm is
reported
cost
Firm js
reported
cost
Firm is
prodution
quantity
Firm is
prot
Ci= cg bCi=bcg bCj=bcg Qd (cg;bcg;bcg)= (a cg)
3
d (cg;bcg;bcg)
= (a cg)
2
9
Ci= cg bCi=bcg bCj=bcb Qd (cg;bcg;bcb)=2(a cg)+2(cb cg)
6
d (cg;bcg;bcb)
= (2(a cg)+2(cb cg))
2
36
Ci= cg bCi=bcb bCj=bcg Qd (cg;bcb;bcg)=2(a cg) (cb cg)
6
d (cg;bcb;bcg)
= (2(a cg) (cb cg))
2
36
Ci= cg bCi=bcb bCj=bcb Qd (cg;bcb;bcb)=2(a cg)+(cb cg)
6
d (cg;bcb;bcb)
= (2(a cg)+(cb cg))
2
36
Ci= cb bCi=bcb bCj=bcg Qd (cb;bcb;bcg)=2(a cb) (1+)(cb cg)
6
d (cb;bcb;bcg)
= (2(a cb) (1+)(cb cg))
2
36
Ci= cb bCi=bcb bCj=bcb Qd (cb;bcb;bcb)=2(a cb) (1 )(cb cg)
6
d (cb;bcb;bcb)
= (2(a cb) (1 )(cb cg))
2
36
A.3 Aggressive accounting regime
Firm is
realized
cost
Firm is
reported
cost
Firm js
reported
cost
Firm is
prodution
quantity
Firm is
prot
Ci= cg bCi=bcg bCj=bcg Qd (cg;bcg;bcg)=2(a cg)+(1 )(cb cg)
6
d (cg;bcg;bcg)
= (2(a cg)+(1 )(cb cg))
2
36
Ci= cg bCi=bcg bCj=bcb Qd (cg;bcg;bcb)=2(a cg)+(1+)(cb cg)
6
d (cg;bcg;bcb)
= (2(a cg)+(1+)(cb cg))
2
36
Ci= cb bCi=bcg bCj=bcg Qd (cb;bcg;bcg)=2(a cb) (cb cg)
6
d (cb;bcg;bcg)
= (2(a cb) (cb cg))
2
36
Ci= cb bCi=bcg bCj=bcb Qd (cb;bcg;bcb)=2(a cb)+(cb cg)
6
d (cb;bcg;bcb)
= (2(a cb)+(cb cg))
2
36
Ci= cb bCi=bcb bCj=bcg Qd (cb;bcb;bcg)=2(a cb) 2(cb cg)
6
d (cb;bcb;bcg)
= (2(a cb) 2(cb cg))
2
36
Ci= cb bCi=bcb bCj=bcb Qd (cb;bcb;bcb)= (a cb)
3
d (cb;bcb;bcb)
= (a cb)
2
9
B Proof of Proposition 1
Based on Appendix A, rm is expected prots under the three di¤erent accounting
regimes are calculated below.
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Unbiased regime:
E [unb:] = 
2 (a  cg)2
9
+ (1  )2 (a  cb)
2
9
+(1  )((a  cg) + (cb   cg))
2
9
+ (1  ) ((a  cb)  (cb   cg))
2
9
(14)
Conservative regime:
E [con:] = 
22
(a  cg)2
9
+  ((1  ) + (1  ))

2 (a  cg) + 2 1 (1 )+(1 ) (cb   cg)
2
36
+(1  )

2(a  cg)  1 (1 )+(1 )(cb   cg)
2
36
+(1  ) ((1  ) + (1  ))

2(a  cg) + 1 (1 )+(1 ) (cb   cg)
2
36
+ (1  )

2 (a  cb) 

1 + 1 
(1 )+(1 )

(cb   cg)
2
36
+ (1  ) ((1  ) + (1  ))

2(a  cb) 

1  1 
(1 )+(1 )

(cb   cg)
2
36
(15)
Aggressive regime:
E [agg:] =
 
2 +  (1  ) 

2 (a  cg) + (1  +((1 ))) (cb   cg)
2
36
+ (1  ) (1  )

2 (a  cg) +

1 + 
+((1 ))

(cb   cg)
2
36
+
 
(1  ) + (1  )2 2

2 (a  cb)  +((1 )) (cb   cg)
2
36
+ (1  )  (1  ) (1  )

2(a  cb) + +((1 ))(cb   cg)
2
36
+ ( (1  ) (1  ) + (1  )  (1  ) (1  ))

2 (a  cb)  2 +((1 )) (cb   cg)
2
36
+ (1  )2 (1  )2 (a  cb)
2
9
(16)
To compute the di¤erence in these payo¤s, we deduct the conservative/aggressive
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payo¤ from the unbiased payo¤.
(17) E [unb:]  E [con:] = 11
36
 (1  ) 1  
1   (cb   cg)
2 > 0
(18) E [unb:]  E [agg:] = 11
36
 (1  ) 
 +     (cb   cg)
2 > 0
Thus we know the payo¤ level under the unbiased accounting regime is always
higher than that under the conservative/aggressive accounting regime.
To demonstrate the relationship between the rm prot and the level of conserva-
tive/aggressive bias, we take the rst-order derivative of rm is payo¤ w.r.t.  and ,
respectively.
(19)
@
@
E [con:] =
11
36
 (1  )2
(1  )2 (cb   cg)
2 > 0
(20)
@
@
E [agg:] =
11
36
(1  ) 2
( +    )2 (cb   cg)
2 < 0
It is clear that the expected rm prot decreases in the level of accounting bias.
C Proof of Corollary 2
Based on Appendix A, the expected consumer surplus in the three di¤erent ac-
counting regimes is calculated below.
Unbiased regime:
E [Vunb:] = 
2 1
2

2 (a  cg)
3
2
+ (1  )2 1
2

2 (a  cb)
3
2
+(1  )

2a  (cb + cg)
3
2
(21)
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Conservative regime:
E [Vcon:] = 
22
1
2

2 (a  cg)
3
2
+ 2(1  )
 
4 (a  cg) + 1 (1 )+(1 ) (cb   cg)
6
!2
+ (1  ) 
0@4 (a  cb) +

1 + 1 
(1 )+(1 )

(cb   cg)
6
1A2
+2(1  )2 1
2
 
2(a  cg) + 1 (1 )+(1 ) (cb   cg)
3
!2
+ (1  ) (1  )
0@4(a  cb) +

1 + 2 1 
(1 )+(1 )

(cb   cg)
6
1A2
+ (1  )2 1
2
0@2(a  cb) 

1  1 
(1 )+(1 )

(cb   cg)
3
1A2(22)
Aggressive regime:
E [Vagg:] = 
2 1
2
 
2 (a  cg) + (1  +((1 ))) (cb   cg)
3
!2
+2 (1  ) 1
2
0@4 (a  cb) +

3  2 
+((1 ))

(cb   cg)
6
1A2
+2 (1  ) (1  ) 1
2
 
4 (a  cg)  (1 + +((1 )))(cb   cg)
6
!2
+2(1  )2 (1  ) 1
2
 
4 (a  cb)  +((1 )) (cb   cg)
6
!2
+ (1  )2 2 1
2
 
2 (a  cb)  +((1 )) (cb   cg)
3
!2
+ (1  )2 (1  )2 1
2

2(a  cb)
3
2
(23)
To compute the di¤erence in these values, we deduct the conservative/aggressive
consumer surplus from the unbiased consumer surplus.
(24) E[Vunb:]  E[Vcon:] =   5
36
 (1  ) 1  
1   (cb   cg)
2 < 0
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(25) E[Vunb:]  E[Vagg:] =   5
36
 (1  ) 
 +     (cb   cg)
2 < 0
Thus we know the level of consumer surplus under the unbiased accounting regime is
always lower than that under the conservative or aggressive accounting regime.
The total social welfare is simply the sum of two investorspayo¤s (rm prot net of
investment I) and consumer surplus. Compared to the unbiased accounting regime, the
increase in consumer surplus is not as high as the decrease in investment payo¤ under
the conservative or aggressive accounting regime. Therefore the total social welfare is
lower under the conservative or aggressive accounting regime than under the unbiased
accounting regime.
D Proof of Proposition 3
First, we compare the expected rm prots under the conservative accounting
regime and the unbiased regime. The expected rm prot under the unbiased ac-
counting regime is
(26) E [unb:] = 
2d (cg; cg) +  (1  ) m (cg) + (1  )K:
The expected rm prot under the conservative accounting regime is
(27) E [con:] = 
22d (cg;cg) +  (1  ) m (cg) + (1  )K:
Taking the di¤erence between these two expected prots, we have
E [con:]  E [unb:]
=  (1  ) ( (1 + )  1) m (cg)  2
 
1  2d (cg; cg) +  (1  )K(28)
For the expected prot under the conservative regime to be higher than the under unbi-
ased regime, it must be true that  (1  ) ( (1 + )  1) m (cg)+2 (2   1) d (cg; cg)+
 (1  )K > 0. Solving for , we have  > 1

m(cg) K
m(cg) d(cg ;cg)   1; or 1    <
2   1

m(cg) K
m(cg) d(cg ;cg) : Since m (cg) =
(a cg)2
4
> d (cg;cg) =
(a cg)2
9
> K, we know
m(cg) K
m(cg) d(cg ;cg) > 1 and thus  > 0 is always satised. It must also be true that
1

m(cg) K
m(cg) d(cg ;cg)   1 < 1, which implies  > 12
m(cg) K
m(cg) d(cg ;cg) : Thus we need 1    <
2  1

m(cg) K
m(cg) d(cg ;cg) and 1 >  >
1
2
m(cg) K
m(cg) d(cg ;cg) for E [con:] > E [unb:] to be true.
Next we examine the change of the rm prot in 1  . Taking the partial derivative,
we have
@
@ (1  )
 
22d (cg;cg) +  (1  ) m (cg)  (I  K + K)

= 2 (m (cg)  d (cg;cg))  (m (cg) K) :(29)
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The rmsprots will decrease in  if 2 (m (cg)  d (cg;cg))  (m (cg) K) > 0,
which is 1    < 1   1
2
m(cg) K
m(cg) d(cg;cg) . We know  > 0 is always satised. Since we
also require  < 1,  > 1
2
m(cg) K
m(cg) d(cg;cg) must hold true.
E Proof of Corollary 4
The expected consumer surplus in the two di¤erent accounting regimes is listed
below.
Unbiased regime:
E [Vunb:] = 
2 1
2

2 (a  cg)
3
2
+ 2 (1  ) 1
2

(a  cg)
2
2
=
1
36
 (9  ) (a  cg)2 :(30)
Conservative regime:
E [Vcon:] = 
22
1
2

2 (a  cg)
3
2
+ 2 (1  ) 1
2

(a  cg)
2
2
=
1
36

 
9    9   82 (a  cg)2 :(31)
It is thus clear that E [Vcon:] > E [Vunb:] when (9   82) > 1, which requires
 2  1
8
; 1

, or 1   2  1; 7
8

:
The total social welfare is the sum of the two investorspayo¤s net of investment I
and consumer surplus.
Unbiased regime:
E[Wunb:] = 2
 
2
(a  cg)2
9
+  (1  ) (a  cg)
2
4
+ (1  )K   I
!
+
1
36
 (9  ) (a  cg)2 :(32)
Conservative regime:
E[Wcon:] = 2
 
22
(a  cg)2
9
+  (1  ) (a  cg)
2
4
+ (1  )K   I
!
+
1
36

 
9    9   82 (a  cg)2 :(33)
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Taking the di¤erence between these two expected welfare levels, we have
E [Wcon:]  E [Wunb:]
=
1
36
 (1  )  72K + 11 (a  cg)2 + 2 (a  cg)2   18 (a  cg)2(34)
For the
 
72K + 11 (a  cg)2 + 2 (a  cg)2   18 (a  cg)2

to be positive;  > (18 11)(a cg)
2 72K
2(a cg)2
must hold, which is equivalent to 1  < 72K (18 13)(a cg)2
2(a cg)2 : Sinced (cg; cg) =
(a cg)2
9
>
K, we know the numerator 18 (a  cg)2   11 (a  cg)2   72K must be positive. Thus
 > 0 is satised. We also require  < 1 and therefore (18 11)(a cg)
2 72K
2(a cg)2 < 1must hold.
That is,  > 18(a cg)
2 72K
13(a cg)2 has to be true. Therefore we need 1   <
72K (18 13)(a cg)2
2(a cg)2
and 1 >  > 18(a cg)
2 72K
13(a cg)2 for E [Wcon:] > E [Wunb:] to be true.
F Proof of Proposition 5
We take the rst-order derivative of the rm prot under the conservative account-
ing regime with regard to 1   and set it to equal 0. Solving for 1  , we have
1   = 36K   (9  10) (a  cg)
2
10 (a  cg)2
:
We also check the second-order condition, which is negative, thus satisfying the re-
quirement for the maximization problem.
@2
@ (1  )2E [con:] =  
5
18
2 (a  cg)2 < 0
Taking the rst-order derivative of the rm prot under the aggressive accounting
regime with regard to , setting it to equal 0, and solving for , we have
 =
 
5
 
(cb   cg)2   (a  cg)2   (a  cb)2

+ 9
 
(a  cb)2   4K

10 (1  ) (a  cb)2
:
The second-order condition holds since
@2
@2
E [agg:] =   5
18
(   1)2 (a  cb)2 < 0:
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G Proof of Proposition 6
When both rms report high costs, the following subgame describes the investors
potential divestment decisions and the corresponding payo¤s.
Firm 1
Firm 2
Divest Do not divest
Divest
K
K
K
m (cb)

or
(1  ) m (cg) +m (cb)y
Do not divest
m (cb)

or
(1  ) m (cg) +m (cb)y
K
d (cb; cb)
d (cb; cb)

unbiased and aggressive regimes; y conservative regime
Suppose there is a random public signal that has two outcomes, fA;Bg, each with a
1
2
probability of occurrence. Suppose, too, investor i agrees to terminate her project
when A occurs and not when B occurs, and investor j agrees to terminate when
B occurs and not when A occurs. Neither investor has incentive to deviate from this
strategy, as it is the best response to each other. Clearly, the resulted investment payo¤
is K+m(cb)
2
= 4K+(a cb)
2
8
under the unbiased and the aggressive accounting regimes,
and K+(1 )m(cg)+m(cb)
2
= 4K+(1 )(a cg)
2+(a cb)2
8
under the conservative accounting
regime.
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